The issue of sexuality and human rights has generated increasing international attention in recent years. This is particularly the case in societies emerging from chronic ethnonationalist conflict, where scholarly debates over the impact of ethnonationalism on sexual rights, such as abortion and the rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender people (LGBT), generate much controversy and division. It is with this disagreement in mind that this paper focuses on the influence of ethnonationalism on attitudes towards the legalisation of same-sex marriage and abortion. Using nationally representative data from Northern Ireland, the results suggest that while ethnonational identity is a significant positive determinant of attitudes towards same-sex marriage within both the Catholic population and among supporters of their main political party (Sinn Féin), it is also a key negative predictor of abortion, albeit solely among Sinn Féin supporters.
Introduction
International human rights bodies, including those of the United Nations (UN), direct increasing attention to both the reproductive rights of women and the rights of the
LGBT community. Despite these demands for LGBT rights and women's reproductive rights, not all citizens or their political leaders endorse such views. This is considered particularly so in nations emerging from deep-seated and violent ethnonational conflict. In such societies, not only is ethnonationalism profoundly intertwined with both gender and sexuality, but since the nation is symbolically imagined as a heteronormative and patriarchal family unit, it both reproduces and sanctions gender differences and sexual inequalities. As a number of scholars have noted, it is this link between heterosexuality as the dominant group norm and taken for granted attribute of the nation that lies at the heart of opposition by ethnonationalist movements to both
LGBT and female reproductive rights (Yuval-Davis and Anthias, 1989; Nagel, 2003) .
The assumption that ethnonationalist movements are intrinsically resistant to gender equality and LGBT rights is contested. As some research demonstrates, many ethnonationalist movements can articulate a more civic and progressive variant of nationalism that advances rights for women and sexual minorities. Similarly, nationalist movements and their political leaders have also co-opted the discourse of a pro-female agenda and LGBT rights, albeit as a cynical tool to mask and further their xenophobic ambitions (Puar, 2007; Farris, 2017 ). Yet, there are limits to this appropriation, especially when reproductive rights feature. Ethnonationalist movements, rather than co-opting women's rights by supporting reproductive rights, are much more likely to instigate policies to prohibit abortion as a mortal threat to the health and survival of the nation (Coakley, 2012; Gilmartin, 2017) .
It is with this suggested differential impact in mind -the positive effect of ethnonationalism on LGBT rights versus its negative effect on female reproductive rights -that the present study focuses on the influence of ethnonationalism on attitudes towards the legalisation of same-sex marriage and abortion in Northern
Ireland. The article proceeds in three stages. First, it discusses the link between ethnonationalism and female reproductive rights and LGBT rights. Second, building on this discussion, it outlines the political nature of the Northern Ireland Agreement, particularly in terms of its consequences for sexual minority rights and the rights of women. Third, using nationally representative data from the 2015 Northern Ireland General Election Survey, 2 it then examines the nature and extent of ethnonationalism, or the degree of congruency in religious, national, communal, and territorial identity, 3 and its relationship to attitudes towards LGBT and female reproductive rights within both the adult population as well as among supporters of the two electorally dominant Second, it is often argued that this dominance of ethnonationalism makes Northern Ireland an extremely patriarchal and homophobic society. More so than any other factor, it is acceptance of the assumed link between the heterosexual family and the maintenance and perpetuation of ethnonational identity, a view reinforced via the intersection of ethnic and religious identity, which many commentators point to as the greatest impediment to the support for sexual minority rights and the reproductive rights of women within this society (Horgan and O'Connor, 2014; Hayes and Nagle, 2016) .
Ethnonationalism, Gender, and Sexuality
The doctrine of ethnonationalism holds that the boundary of the nation-state must be coterminous with the ethnie. In so being, ethnonationalism is conceptualised as typically adhering to the ethnic rather than the civic variant. In the civic form, nationalism is constructed as relatively liberal and cosmopolitan, with nationality tied to citizenship, while ethnic nationalism is presented as the mirror image -combining conservatism with a propensity to xenophobia, and the national community imagined as bound by shared culture and ancestry (Smith, 1991) . This imagined singularity between the ethnic group and nation is captured in the Latin origin of the word 'nationality' -natio -which means 'to be born', thus implying a common biological origin and descent of the people (Albanese, 2004) . In framing the nation as a biological self-perpetuating group, ethnonationalists are seen to interlink national boundaries with sexual and gender ones (Nagel 2003) .
Feminist scholars have long illuminated how women's roles in ethnonationalist formations are often exalted as biological producers of members of ethnic collectivities (see Yuval-Davis and Anthias, 1989; Nagel, 2003) . This valorisation of motherhood and control of female reproduction by ethnonationalist movements, or what Vickers (1990: 485) refers to as 'the battle of the cradle', results in norms and policies that simultaneously rewards reproduction and penalizes nonreproductive women. While the forms they take are historically specific and shaped by a number of factors, these pro-natalist policies range from the 'restriction of contraceptive knowledge and techniques, denial of abortions, and provision of material rewards for bearing children' (Peterson, 1999: 44) . Thus, not only are women's reproductive rights and health jeopardized under nationalist regimes to ensure the 'good health' of the nation but because women are charged as agents for the biological renewal of the nation their access to abortion is often framed as analogous to treason and 'race suicide' (Albanese, 2004: 12) .
Male and female sexuality is also regulated by ethnonationalists. Nonheterosexuality destabilizes and threatens the narrative of the nation because it challenges the fixed categories of national identity; sexual minorities thus represent pollutants to the idea of the national family (Hayes and Nagle, 2016) . Ethnonationalist forms of hegemonic masculinity are strongly institutionalized and sexual minorities are denounced as either non-patriotic or a threat to the very survival and reproduction of the nation. Thus, as Friedland (2011: 2) points out, many ethnonationalist movements 'are preoccupied with the regulation of sexuality -homosexuality, abortion, marriage, divorce pre-and extra-marital sexuality'.
The assumption that ethnonationalist movements are intrinsically opposed to
LGBT and women's rights, however, obscures a more complex reality. Rather than being uniformly ethnic in character, a number of scholars note that some ethnonationalist movements have articulated a more civic variant of nationalism that includes progressive policies to advance rights for women and sexual minorities. This seems to be particularly the case when women have been involved as armed activists (Ashe, 2007; O'Keefe, 2013; Gilmartin, 2017) . Similarly, nationalist movements have also co-opted the discourse of a pro-female agenda and LGBT rights, albeit as a tool to promote their putative liberal and progressive values in distinction to their rivals who are framed as backward and conservative. In particular, Puar (2007: 4) has coined the term 'homonationalism' to capture how nationalist movements, rather than being heteronormative, promote 'acceptance' and 'tolerance' for LGBT populations as the 'barometer by which the legitimacy of, and capacity for national sovereignty is evaluated'.
As noted earlier, however, there are boundaries restricting this process of cooption, especially in relation to reproductive rights. Ethnonationalist movements, rather than co-opting women's rights by supporting reproductive rights, are much more likely to instigate policies to prohibit abortion as a mortal threat to the health and survival of the nation. This intractable resistance to reproductive rights cannot be purely explained as fundamentally due to the often religious leanings of between the two ethnonationalist traditions of unionism and nationalism, a key assumption of the Agreement was that deep-seated communal divisions could be accommodated and eventually resolved through institutional power-sharing arrangements (Hayes and McAllister, 2013) . Although the Agreement was primarily designed to manage and eventually resolve ethnonational conflict, it was also the first political initiative to commit the political parties to formally recognise women's right to political inclusion. The Agreement requests: 'the parties to affirm in particular:…the right of women to full and equal political participation ' (Northern Ireland Office, 1998: 20) . In addition to the political inclusion of women, the Agreement also sought to safeguard the interests of members of society that subscribed to identities outside of the ethnonationalist framework. In particular, the Agreement stated that public authorities in Northern Ireland would: 'promote equality of opportunity in relation to religion and political opinion; gender; race; disability; age; marital status; dependents; and sexual orientation' (Northern Ireland Office, 1998: 20) .
Despite these obligations and commitments in the Agreement, not all political analysts are supportive of such consociational power-sharing arrangements in addressing gender inequality and the lack of sexual minority rights. Proponents of this position point to the negative aspects of consociationalism, namely its tendency to reify communal division at the expense of other forms of social inequality, such as those based on gender, class, or sexual orientation (Taylor, 2009 ). Feminist scholarship, in particular, has been highly critical of consociational power-sharing arrangements, pointing not only to the systematic marginalisation of women and their collective interests but also to the reproduction of patriarchal privilege in these institutions and practices (Kennedy et al., 2016) . Even feminist scholars who endorse consociationalism suggest that women and their interests are ill-served by such political arrangements. As Byrne and McCulloch (2012: 566, 568) put it: ' [while] there is nothing inherent in power-sharing that cannot be made more democratic and inclusive of women…the failure to theorize gender and recognize gender power relations means that women remain invisible in the literature's prescription for conflict resolution and in power-sharing practices.'
Previous research lends support to this feminist view. Despite the various commitments to gender equality and sexual minority rights and notwithstanding the recently assumed female leadership of both the DUP and Sinn Féin in the Assembly, the post-Agreement period has not proved conducive to the advancement of women or
LGBT rights. As a number of scholars have noted, not only has the political arena remained a cold house for the advancement of women's issues, but women have also to support the extension of access to abortion where there is a serious risk or grave danger to the health of the woman, although it should be noted that the motion to extend the availability of abortion, which was proposed by the party's ruling executive (ard comhairle), did not allow Sinn Fein members a conscience vote on the issue and some members, including a senior figure in the party, spoke passionately against it.
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A similar lack of progress is evident when LGBT rights are considered.
Despite the commitment to sexual minority rights enshrined in the Agreement, there is evidence to suggest that homophobic attacks and sentiment have increased markedly in the post-Agreement period (Hayes and Nagle, 2016) . In contrast to the relative cross-cleavage consensus on abortion, however, elected representatives of the two main ethnonationalist parties are sharply divided in their attitudes towards sexual minority rights. While Sinn Féin has sought to support sexual minority rights, namely by conflating their struggle as a minority movement struggle, 10 the DUP have adopted an extremely negative stance in relation to the LGBT population (Hayes and Nagle, 2016) . 11 This sharp division in attitudes is evident in their views on the legalisation of same-sex marriage, where the DUP have on five separate occasions used their position as a leading partner in the power-sharing government to impede such legislation. By triggering a petition of concern in each instance -such that the motion can only be passed if a majority of unionists and nationalists support it -not only did the DUP exercise the 'communal' veto to block legislation to further equality for a non-ethnonationalist grouping, in this case sexual minorities, but in doing so they used a mechanism originally designed to negate majoritarian ethnonational politics. 
Ethnonationalism and Attitudes Towards Same-Sex Marriage and Abortion
The conflict in Northern Ireland has been characterised as a long-standing dispute over two contested ethnonational identities: those who identify as British and wish to retain the union between Northern Ireland and Great Britain versus those who identify as Irish and aspire to see the two parts of the island of Ireland united (McGarry and O'Leary, 1995) . While the terms 'Protestant' and 'Catholic' serve as important boundary-markers, the conflict cannot be reduced to religious terms or even to a clash between two opposing and uniform ethnonational identities. As previous research has shown, both within and between the dominant ethnonational traditions -Britishunionist and Irish-Nationalist -there are also important intra-religious differences in national, communal and territorial identity (Coakley, 2007; Hayes and McAllister, 2013 ).
The results in Table 1 lend further support to these findings. Although national identity, communal affiliation and territorial identity overlap in both religious communities, they are not coterminous. For example, while around eight out of every ten Protestants see themselves as British, around seven out of ten adopt a unionist label, and an overwhelming majority support remaining part of the UK, only threefifths endorse all three identities. A similar pattern emerges when the Catholic community is considered. Although around six out of every ten Catholics see themselves as Irish, seven out of ten are willing to adopt a Nationalist label and just under eight out of ten want Ireland reunited, only about half, or 52 per cent, are willing to endorse all three labels. Thus, for both religious communities, there is evidence to suggest that although there is a strong reinforcement between national identity, communal affiliation and territorial allegiance, they are not interchangeable.
[Insert [Insert Table 2 about here]
As the data in Table 2 To what extent do these differences remain when a range of potentially confounding variables, such as gender, religious belief and practice, age and educational attainment, are included in the analysis? It is to this, our final questionthe net impact of ethnonationalism on attitudes towards same-sex marriage and abortion -that we now turn.
The Effect of Ethnonationalism on Attitudes Towards Same-Sex

Marriage and Abortion
To investigate this question, Tables 3 and 4 present the results for a series of binary logistic regression models which focus on the net effect of congruency in ethnonationalism on attitudes toward the legalisation of same-sex marriage (Table 3) and abortion (Table 4) . Given the overwhelming level of support for same-sex marriage among both Sinn Féin supporters and within the Catholic population, and to allow for a direct comparison of the results, logistic regression analysis was chosen as the method for analysis in this instance. 14 For the purposes of this investigation, attitudes towards same-sex marriage and abortion have been recoded to the following two categories: strongly agree/agree (coded 1) and neither agree or disagree/disagree/strongly disagree (coded 0). The included potentially confounding background control variables are: gender, age, educational attainment, and religious belief and practice. There is now a considerable body of research both in Northern
Ireland and elsewhere to indicate that women, the young, the well-educated and the more secular members of society are more supportive of both same-sex marriage and abortion rights than men, older individuals, the lesser educated and those of religious faith (Froese and Badar, 2008; Hayes and Dowds, 2015; Evans and Tonge, 2016; Jelen, 2017) . With the exception of age (coded in terms of years), all control variables were included as a series of dummy variables (coded 0 and 1) in the analysis.
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Turning now to the results, multivariate analysis lends some further, albeit partial, support to our earlier bivariate findings. Even when a range of background variables are controlled for in the analysis, ethnonationalism emerged as a significant net predictor of attitudes towards same-sex marriage and abortion, albeit solely within the Catholic community and among Sinn Féin supporters (see Tables 4 and 5 ).
Moreover, and in further confirmation of our earlier findings, while congruency in ethnonational identity was a positive net predictor of attitudes towards same-sex marriage within both the Catholic community and among Sinn Féin supporters, it also emerged as a significant, albeit negative, predictor of attitudes towards abortion rights among supporters of Sinn Féin.
Focusing initially on religious and party differences in attitudes towards the legalisation of same-sex marriage the results in [Insert Table 4 These results are only partially replicated when views concerning abortion are examined (see Table 4 ). While congruency in ethnonationalist identity also emerged as a significant determinant of attitudes towards the legalisation of abortion, its effect 
Conclusion
The impact of ethnonationalism on sexual rights, such as abortion and the rights of LGBT people, is both complex and much contested. While some scholars point to the highly regressive and punitive effect of ethnonationalist movements on female reproductive rights and sexual minority rights, others suggest that some ethnonationalisms, particularly non-state nationalist movements in which women have been armed activists, can also produce positive results for both LGBT people and (Gilmartin, 2017) . Moreover, at least as far as reproductive rights are concerned, there is evidence to suggest that abortions are now even more restrictive than in the past (Whitaker and Horgan, 2017) .
Finally, the results also point to the ability of competing ethnonationalist movements to co-opt and manipulate sexual rights both as a source of unity (lack of reproductive rights) as well as a source of division (sexual minority rights) in the postconflict period. It is to this question -the manipulation of sexual rights by ethnonationalist movements for political expediency and gain in the post-accord period -that future research should be addressed. This is especially so in post-conflict societies based on power-sharing agreements such as Northern Ireland where debates over sexual rights and the use of communal vetoes can be used to perpetuate the war by other means.
Endnotes
1
Given its dominance in the research literature and associated legislative and policy initiatives, we use LGBT rather than LGBTQ or LGBTQI, although it should be noted that debates about bisexual and transgender concerns have received much less attention than those related to lesbian and gay rights. electoral success was also due to their ability to moderate on key areas (Mitchell et al., 2009) . While members voted 59 to 40 against allowing abortion in cases of fatal foetal abnormality, they voted 64 to 30 against abortion in the cases of rape and incest.
7
In terms of the position of the other main unionist and nationalist parties, while the UUP has left abortion as a matter of personal conscience for its elected representatives, the SDLP describes themselves as pro-life and are opposed to abortion (Thomson, 2016 Sinn Féin also supports the removal of the 8 th amendment, which protects the life of unborn children, from the constitution of the Republic of Ireland.
10
Sinn Féin has a long history of supporting equality for LGBT people as a minority rights issue. Linking the lack of equality for sexual minorities to second-class citizenship, in 1980, Sinn Féin passed a motion at the Ard Feis to oppose the criminalisation of homosexuality, the first party to do so on the island of Ireland. Much of the impetus for promoting the equality of LGBT people was again instigated by feminists within the Sinn Féin Women's Department (O'Keefe, 2013) . However, there is some evidence to suggest that although Sinn Féin was more supportive of equality discourses for sexual minorities than their unionist/loyalist opponents many gay and lesbian activists within the nationalist community felt the need to hide their sexual orientation for fear of being ostracised by Sinn Féin as well as the broader republican movement (O'Keefe, 2013: 178) .
11
In terms of the position of the other main unionist and nationalist parties, while the UUP has left same-sex marriage as a matter of personal conscience for its elected representatives, the SDLP are vocally supportive of the issue (Thomson, 2016) .
12
The most recent vote on same-sex marriage in the Northern Ireland Assembly occurred in November 2015 where despite majority support for the first time -53 members supported the motion in favour of the legalisation of same-sex marriage while 52 voted against -it failed to achieve the required cross-community majority -only four unionists supported the motion as compared to 41 nationalist -and was not passed. Currently, Northern Ireland is the only region within the United Kingdom that has not introduced legislation to permit same-sex marriage.
13
Differences in religious denomination are examined here not to emphasise any theological differences but as a means to investigate the two main religious communities -Protestant and Catholic -in terms of their distinct ethnonational identities and political affiliations. 
15
Additional bivariate analysis demonstrates that while some of the control variables are significantly associated with each other, in no instance are the zero-correlations greater than 0.6, suggesting that multicollinearity is not a problem in this instance. The variance inflation factor (VIF) for each of the analyses -less than 2.64 in all instances -further supports this finding. 
Note: Attitudes towards same-sex marriage are coded 1 (strongly agree/agree) and 0 (other); *, significant at the 0.05 level; **, significant at the 0.01 level; a , missing category for comparison. Standard errors are in parenthesis.
Source: Northern Ireland General Election Survey, 2015. 
Note: Attitudes towards abortion are coded 1 (strongly agree/agree) and 0 (other); *, significant at the 0.05 level; **, significant at the 0.01 level; a , missing category for comparison. Standard errors are in parenthesis.
Source: Northern Ireland General Election Survey, 2015.
